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The term was coined by the McGill Faculty of Law, in Montreal, Canada. See
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―Nothing fixes a thing so intensely in the memory as the wish
to forget it.‖ — MICHEL DE MONTAIGNE
―That the individual shall have full protection in person and in
property is a principle as old as the common law; but it has been
found necessary from time to time to define anew the exact nature
and extent of such protection.‖ — SAMUEL D. WARREN and
LOUIS D. BRANDEIS3
INTRODUCTION
This is a time of remarkable opportunity for innovation and
strategic information management, but also one of tremendous
confusion. We are on the one hand hearing from Facebook‘s Mark
Zuckerberg and others that privacy is outdated, shut out by
evolving social norms,4 while on the other hand hearing from the
FTC‘s David Vladeck that privacy should be understood as
housing a dignity interest.5 These disparate views have sparked
some degree of bewilderment in United States lawyers and invite
much-needed reflection on the very meaning of the term ―privacy.‖
Behavioral and data mining technologies are advancing at a
rapid pace.6 As these technologies continue to advance, American
companies—perhaps even those with the most established privacy
protocols—are hounded in Europe for not doing enough to protect
the information that these technologies gather.7 What is more, the
3

Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
193 (1890) (emphasis added).
4
See, e.g., Mashall Kirkpatrick, Facebook‟s Zuckerberg Says the Age of Privacy is
Over, READWRITEWEB (Jan. 9, 2010, 9:25 PM), http://www.readwriteweb.com/archives/
facebooks_zuckerberg_says_the_age_of_privacy_is_ov.php.
5
Stephanie Clifford, Fresh Views at Agency Overseeing Online Ads, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 4, 2009, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/05/business/media/
05ftc.html?_r=1.
6
See generally id. (addressing data mining technologies used by Sears, which resulted
in a recent lawsuit settled by the FTC).
7
See, e.g., John Hooper, Google Executives Convicted in Italy over Abuse Video,
GUARDIAN, Feb. 24, 2010, at p1, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/
2010/feb/24/google-video-italy-privacy-convictions (discussing the prosecution and
conviction of Google‘s privacy officer, Peter Fleischer, in Italy); German Minister Takes
on Google StreetView, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Feb. 8, 2010), http://www.spiegel.de/
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conflicting messages regarding the definition of privacy—along
with the significant divergences between the respective approaches
of the United States and Continental Europe to data privacy and
the inherent commercial obstacles those differences pose8—prompt
us to revisit the conventional construction of such foundational
concepts as privacy and personal information. Specifically, these
distinctions prompt us to ask the question: what is the proper
balance to be struck between the need to respect fundamental
human rights and the demands of an ever-expanding digital
economy?9 Questions like this are particularly relevant due to the
advent of the ―Internet of Things,‖10 transcending the computer
and creeping into everyday objects.11
Out of this tension, and the relative legal vacuum

international/germany/0,1518,676616,00.html.
8
Businesses in the European Economic Area (―EEA‖) are generally prohibited from
sharing personal data with any company in the United States, even with a parent
company in the United States, unless they take certain affirmative compliance steps to
ensure an adequate level of data protection. See generally Regulation 45/2001, of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2000 on the Protection of
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data by the Community
Institutions and Bodies and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 2001 O.J. (L 8),
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2001:008:
0001:0022:en:PDF; Lisa J. Sotto, Aaron P. Simpson, & Boris Segalis, Law Firms Face
Risks in Handling Personal Information, HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP,
http://www.cnapro.com/pdf/LawFirmsFaceRisksHandlingPersonalInformation%20(Hunt
onWilliams).pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2011).
9
The international community has struggled to resolve challenges regarding the
protection of intellectual property and right to privacy. See, e.g., Special Rapporteur on
the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Rep. of
the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of
Opinion and Expression, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/27 (May 16,
2011) (by Frank La Rue), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/
docs/17session/A.HRC.17.27_en.pdf.
10
The term ―Internet of Things‖ refers generally to linking of physical and virtual
objects by means of radio frequency identification (RFID) and other capabilities. This
idea presumes the existence of highly autonomous data capture by computers, which
would enable the tracking of things (even people) in real time. This has significant
implications for current notions of privacy and autonomy. See, e.g., IAN KERR, ON THE
IDENTITY TRAIL: UNDERSTANDING THE IMPORTANCE AND IMPACT OF ANONYMITY AND
AUTHENTICATION IN A NETWORKED SOCIETY 335 (Oxford Univ. Press 2009).
11
See, e.g., Brian X. Chen, iPhone‟s Location-Data Collection Can‟t Be Turned Off,
WIRED (Apr. 25, 2011), http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2011/04/iphone-location-optout/.
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characterizing modern privacy law, the controversial idea of a legal
―right to be forgotten‖12 has emerged and is increasingly gaining
traction in Europe, particularly in France and in Switzerland.13
However, enshrining a so-called ―right to be forgotten‖, which
empowers an individual in some instances to ―erase‖ certain online
footprints in order to ―repair‖ reputational harms, clashes head-on
with cherished legal values in America—foremost, the freedom of
expression.14 Given the borderless nature of e-commerce, by
virtue of which American companies must contend with European
regulation, the novel concept of a right to be forgotten—and
perhaps more importantly the legal lacuna that birthed it—must be
further explored through the lens of comparative inquiry.
It stands to reason that the impetuses for that divisive
proposal15—namely, enshrining a right to be forgotten—are the

12

Such a right has been proposed by the European Union. See, e.g., Elizabeth Flock,
Should We Have a Right to be Forgotten Online?, WASH. POST (Apr. 20, 2011, 12:23
PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/blogpost/post/should-we-have-a-right-to-beforgotten-online/2011/04/20/AF2iOPCE_blog.html; Matt Warman, EU Proposes Online
Right „To Be Forgotten‟, TELEGRAPH (Nov. 5, 2010, 12:55 PM), http://www.telegraph.
co.uk/technology/internet/8112702/EU-proposes-online-right-to-be-forgotten.html.
13
See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, The Council,
The Economic and Social Committee and The Committee of the Regions: A
Comprehensive Approach on Personal Data Protection in the European Union, at 2,
COM (2010) 609 final (Nov, 4, 2010). See also generally, Mallet-Poujol, supra note 1;
Emma Barnett, Sarkozy Prioritizes Internet Regulation at G8 Summit, TELEGRAPH (May
24, 2011, 7:00 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/8531274/Sarkozyprioritises-internet-regulation-at-G8-summit.html; Chloé Woitier, Nicolas Sarkozy
souhaite faire de la régulation d‟Internet un enjeu du G8 [Nicolas Sarkozy Wants to
Make an Issue Out of Internet Regulation G8], LE MONDE.FR, (Jan. 11, 2011, 4 :04 PM),
http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2011/01/11/nicolas-sarkozy-souhaite-fairede-la-regulation-d-internet-un-enjeu-du-g8_1464149_651865.html.
See also Franz
Werro, The Right to be Informed v. the Right to be Forgotten : A TransAtlantic Clash, in
HAFTUNGSRECHT IM DRITTEN MILLENIUM—LIABILITY IN THE THIRD MILLENNIUM 285–
300 (Aurelia Colombi Ciacchi, Christine Godt, Peter Rott & Leslie Jane Smith eds.,
2009).
14
See, e.g., Manuel Baigorri & Emma Ross-Thomas, Google Challenges Five Privacy
Orders by Regulator at Spanish Appeal Court, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 19, 2011, 6:32 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-19/google-challenges-five-privacy-orders-byregulator-at-spanish-appeal-court.html; John Hendel, In Europe, a Right to Be Forgotten
Trumps the Memory of the Internet, ATLANTIC (Feb. 3, 2011, 11:16 AM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2011/02/in-europe-a-right-to-beforgotten-trumps-the-memory-of-the-internet/70643/.
15
See infra notes 64–79 and accompanying text.
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very shortcomings of the prevailing privacy framework, or indeed
frameworks. The relevant norms are anachronistically sectoral in
the U.S,16 and are universally cumbersome, regardless of whether
their provenance is public, as with government laws, or private, as
in the case of Facebook‘s privacy statement.17 As such, these
norms fail to shield users from the sorts of harm not easily
remedied on an Internet of infinite memory. And with respect to
the burgeoning technologies of greatest relevance, such as
analytics, the pertinent norms are also increasingly ineffective.18
The rules are paradoxically too few or too many and range from
what is arguably becoming a compliance, securities-style
framework in the United States to a quasi-blanket prohibition on
analytics in Germany.19
On the Internet more is generally not better, and, in its
complexity, the existing patchwork of privacy norms is rapidly
falling into desuetude.20 Convoluted and dense privacy norms
quickly undermine their very raison d‟être.21 The current attempts
at regulation are, for the most part, predicated on an impoverished
16

See, e.g., Lisa J. Sotto, PRIVACY & DATA SECURITY LAW DESKBOOK (Aspen
Publishers 2011) (using the United States‘ legal framework as one such example).
17
According to the New York Times, Facebook‘s privacy policy is more than 5,000
words—longer than the United States Constitution. Nick Bilton, Price of Facebook
Privacy? Start Clicking, N. Y. TIMES, May 12, 2010, at B8, available at http://www.
nytimes.com/2010/05/13/technology/personaltech/13basics.html.
18
See, e.g., Best Practices, SEARCHDEX.COM, http://www.searchdex.com/
best_practices.shtml (last visited Sept. 11, 2011) (noting that one of its guiding principles
is to help clients ensure compliance with search engines‘ guidelines).
19
See Tracy, Google Analytics Banned in Germany, UPVERY (Jan. 14, 2011),
http://www.upvery.com/38606-google-analytics-banned-in-germany.html; see also Robin
Wauters, Achtung! Google Analytics is Illegal, Say German Government Officials,
TECHCRUNCH EUROPE (Nov. 24, 2009), http://eu.techcrunch.com/2009/11/24/googleanalytics-illegal-germany/.
20
See, e.g., Bilton, supra note 17, at B8.
21
See generally Chaire en Droit de la Sécurité et des Affaires Electroniques [Chair in
Security Law and E-Business], BLOGUE JURIDIQUE: GAUTRAIS.COM, http://www.gautrais.
com/-Blogue-juridique (last visited Oct. 25, 2011) (Can.) (posting various French
publications indicating that less is more online). See also Bilton, supra note 18, at B8.
Regarding disclosures, David Vladeck remarked to the New York Times, ―I don‘t believe
that most consumers either read them, or, if they read them, really understand it.‖ The
Editors, An Interview with David Vladeck of the FTC, N.Y. TIMES: MEDIA DECODER
BLOG (Aug. 5, 2009, 2:24 PM), http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/05/aninterview-with-david-vladeck-of-the-ftc/.
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conception of privacy and ―personal information,‖ the latter being
both over-and under-inclusive.22
Why do concepts matter? Before we can go any further in
crafting a meaningful, interoperable privacy harm-prevention
policy, what we mean by privacy (and even ―personal
information‖) needs to be rethought, paying particular attention to
definitions across borders. The global governance of data invites a
cosmopolitan understanding of privacy law.23 ―Trans-systemic
thought,‖ 24 defined as the ability ―to identify points of interface
between systems‖ and harness them towards effective policymaking and the creation of interoperable definitions of
foundational concepts, is therefore of the essence.
Concepts have very practical ramifications; they are the
intellectual hooks used to put in place normative foundations
which allow businesses to interact with regulators and clients on a
global scale.25
Concepts can eventually help us posit an
understanding of privacy that helps to reconcile diverging visions.
They can also lead to effective global practices capable, for
example, of distinguishing between counterproductive data mining
and data mining that stimulates innovation without undermining
the user trust upon which the digital economy ultimately
depends.26
22

See, e.g., Bilton, supra note 18, at B8 (suggesting that Facebook‘s privacy policy is
both over-and under-inclusive in terms of the personal information it protects—underinclusive in that the ―community pages‖ feature ―automatically links personal data, like
hometown or university, to topic pages for that town or university,‖ and over-inclusive in
that the only way to be removed from those pages is to delete the personal data from
Facebook altogether).
23
Transsytemia is a concept articulated by McGill Law School in its explanation of its
―transystemic legal education,‖ a unique model based on the world of borderless human
interactions we live in today. For a further explanation of transsytemia and the need for a
cosmopolitan understanding of the law, see Transystemic Legal Education, MCGILL
LAW: QUEBEC RESEARCH CENTRE OF PRIVATE AND COMPARATIVE LAW, http://www.
mcgill.ca/crdpcq/transsystemic/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2011).
24
Id.
25
See, e.g., W. Park, Rules and Standards in Private International Law, 73
ARBITRATION 441, 444–45 (2007).
26
See generally Usama Fayyad, Gregory Piatetsky-Shapiro & Padhraic Smyth, From
Data Mining to Knowledge Discovery in Databases, 17 AI MAG. 37 (1996), available at
http://www.aaai.org/ojs/index.php/aimagazine/article/view/1230/1131. Data mining
refers to the identification of patterns in data through clustering and classifying
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Accordingly, recognizing and bridging the cultural gap in
policies and practices is crucial. What we mean by these key
concepts needs to be more clearly enunciated. Otherwise,
Americans and others (including Continental Europeans, those
living in APEC Countries, and many more) will find themselves
speaking at each other using the same word (―privacy‖) with
entirely different connotations. The result is a technological
―tower of Babel‖ with frustrating hurdles27 that ultimately prompts
policy makers to conceive of ―privacy‖ and ―access‖ as hopelessly
and inevitably adversarial terms.
Conceptual uncertainty can also readily produce significant
gaffes with unintended consequences. Thus, for instance, when
Oracle‘s CEO suggested that ―privacy is an illusion‖28 or when
Sun System‘s Scott McNealy told us to ―get over‖ having no
privacy,29 they—as Americans steeped in a privacy of expectation
and seclusion30—were presumably referring to what this paper
labels an outdated notion of the concept, rather than one defined by
control over personhood or freedom from reputational and related
harms.
In this vein, comparative inquiry can have important practical
benefits. It can recognize those underlying assumptions that
generate conceptual obstacles to protecting privacy in the digital
age, and it can eventually aid scholars and lawmakers in
formulating more coherent policy in this area. To best illustrate
this point, this paper adopts the following structure. Part I
provides a succinct overview of the rationale animating privacy
information, a process primarily used in analyzing collections of observations of
behavior. See generally id.
27
See, e.g., Mike Swift, Battle Brewing over Control of Personal Data Online,
PHYSORG.COM (June 29, 2011), http://www.physorg.com/news/2011-06-brewingpersonal-online.html. Any information relating to an identifiable individual is considered
―personal data.‖ Id. This data may be contained in paper files, computer files, e-mails,
film, etc. Id. Privacy concerns have been growing in both Washington and Europe over
the voluminous personal data being collected online. Id.
28
NDouglas, Larry Ellison‟s Privacy is Largely an Illusion, GAWKER (Feb 2, 2006,
7:51 AM), http://valleywag.gawker.com/152187/larry-ellisons-privacy-is-largely-anillusion.
29
Private Lives? Not Ours!, PC WORLD (April 18, 2000), http://www.pcworld.com/
article/16331/private_lives_not_ours.html.
30
See infra Part I.
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protections in Common Law jurisdictions, with particular emphasis
on the United States. It will highlight the ―growing disconnect
between people‘s perception of privacy and the rapid growth of
various forms of surveillance.‖31 Further, it will examine the
challenges that the digital economy poses to an expectation-driven
and spatially-defined standard of privacy. Part II provides a brief
survey of the increasingly fashionable ―right to be forgotten‖ and
the factors driving this initiative in Europe. It suggests that the
recognition of such a right comes in response to an outdated and
ineffective designation of privacy,32 which sparked a backlash of
sorts in the face of our increasing inability to freely control the
development of our ―digital‖ personhood transnationally.
Whatever ultimately becomes of this ―right to be forgotten,‖ it is
argued that this nascent European proposition‘s significance lies in
its distinctive underlying vision of privacy, inviting us to consider
an outcome-related, consumer-responsibility alternative to identity
management in the age of predictive technologies. Finally and
relatedly, Part III proceeds to highlight the potential contribution of
civilian thinking33 to refashioning the conceptual foundations of
privacy policy. More specifically, it suggests that privacy be reconceptualized as the right to mold one‘s identity autonomously
along with the corollary duty not to compromise one‘s personal
information unnecessarily in a digital age of infinite memory.34
31
See David Lyon, Globalizing Surveillance: Comparative and Sociological
Perspectives, 19 INT‟L SOC. 135, 149 (2004) (discussing Canadians‘ penchant for
acquiescing to surveillance from a sociological perspective). Lyon‘s study interestingly
reveals that while Canadians do not seem to attach a very high value to their privacy,
Quebeckers (governed by the civil law tradition) do. Id. While that in itself by no means
definitively points to the legal tradition‘s determinative influence on public perception of
privacy, it does raise questions as to the law‘s impact on culture and vice versa.
32
The right has been increasingly criticized in the United States for this reason. See,
e.g., Gordon Crovitz, Op-Ed., The Right to Privacy from Brandeis to Flickr, WALL ST. J.,
July 25, 2011, at A11, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903
554904576461990729880756.html.
33
Specifically, this section relies on abstract views of the French and German models
of civilian thinking.
34
This approach is arguably reflected (however subtly) in the Cour de Cassation‟s
recent privacy case, Bruno B. vs. Giraud et Migot. See Cour de cassation [Cass.]
[Supreme Court for Judicial Matters] Paris, soc., Dec. 15, 2009, Bull civ. V, No. 2651
(Fr.), available at http://www.juritel.com/Ldj_html-1485.html. For an English analysis
of the case, see Trevor Jefferies & Alvin F. Lindsay, New French Case Removes
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I. THE COMMON LAW APPROACH
In the United States and in the common law world generally,
―[p]rivacy is best treated as a property right. Property grants an
owner the exclusive right to dispose of what he owns. Privacy is
the exclusive right to dispose of access to one‘s proper (private)
domain.‖35
Not surprisingly therefore, ―[i]n the United States, judicial
protection of privacy depends on whether an individual has a
reasonable expectation that the information in question will remain
private. Stated another way, the question is whether society
recognizes the individual‘s claimed expectation of privacy as
reasonable.‖36 Arguably this approach discounts context. Indeed,
the tendency to associate privacy externally or spatially with
property, instead of as dignity inherent in personality, may not lend
Automatic Privacy Shield From Employee E-Mails, Making Them More Amenable to US
Discovery, HOGAN LOVELLS CHRONICLE OF DATA PROTECTION (Feb. 18, 2010),
http://www.hldataprotection.com//2010/02/articles/litigation/new-french-case-removesautomatic-privacy-shield-from-employee-emails-making-them-more-amenable-to-usdiscovery/. For purposes of interoperability, this approach—not unlike the German
court‘s fresh characterization of privacy as ―informational self-determination‖—can in
turn be reconciled with a modernized common law notion of privacy as Liberty. See
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Dec. 15, 1983, 65
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 1 (Ger.); Press Release,
German Federal Constitutional Court, Provisions in the North-Rhine Westphalia
Constitution Protection Act (Verfassungsschutzgesetz Nordrhein-Westfalen) on Online
Searches and on the Reconnaissance of the Internet Null and Void (Feb. 27, 2008),
available
at
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en/press/bvg08-022en.html
(reiterating the right to informational self-determination: ―the manifestations of the
general right of personality previously developed in the case-law of the Federal
Constitutional Court, do not adequately take account of the need for protection arising as
a consequence of the development of information technology.‖). See also Grundgesetz
für die Bundersrepublik Deutschland [Grundgesetz] [GG] [Basic Law], May 23, 1949,
BGBl. I, arts. 2, 10, 13 (Ger.) (highlighting that Dignity (article 2) is the only right read
in conjunction with other rights); Edward J. Eberle, Human Dignity, Privacy, and
Personality in German and American Constitutional Law, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 963
(1997); Eric Mitnick, Procedural Due Process and Reputational Harm: Liberty as SelfInvention, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 79, 79, available at http://lawreview.law.ucdavis.edu/
issues/43-1_Mitnick.pdf (arguing that liberty needs be understood as ―comprising
individual self-invention‖).
35
Ernest van den Haag, On Privacy, in NOMOS XIII: PRIVACY 149, 150–51 (J. Roland
Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1971).
36
Shaun B. Spencer, Reasonable Expectations and the Erosion of Privacy, 39 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 843, 847 (2002).
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itself as well to realms outside the physical world, like
cyberspace.37
Although the rationales justifying the treatment of privacy as
property may have found legitimacy in the past, today they are the
object of increasing scrutiny and critique.38 This property-based or
spatially-based construction which unconsciously, if not otherwise,
continues to animate modern American privacy law is awkward in
the information technology context. For instance, this antiquated
rationale would dictate that an individual has few or no privacy
rights in the public realm—or indeed in most of cyberspace, which
now includes the Internet of things39—where it would be
unreasonable to expect to be left alone.40
Thus, North American scholars tend to embark on
discussions of privacy with the origins of the
invasion of privacy tort, born of a seminal article
titled ―The Right to Privacy‖. Though seldom
addressed, the historical roots of that right in
common-law England are particularly instructive.
Under the English common law, the right to privacy
was first recognized by virtue of its intricate link to
personal property. This is best evidenced by the
now infamous saying, ―[T]he house of every one is
his castle,‖ first coined by the House of Lords in
37
Karen Eltis, The Judicial System in the Digital Age: Revisiting the Relationship
Between Privacy and Accessibility in the Cyber Context, 56 MCGILL L.J. 289, 313
(2011). See also Eberle, supra note 34 at 974; James Q. Whitman, The Two Western
Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1181 (2004)
(discussing dignity in the civilian culture as it pertains to privacy).
38
See generally Eltis, supra note 37.
39
See id. at 24–26.
40
Take, for instance, the example of wiretapping in the United States. Strikingly
symptomatic of the emergent tendency to anticipate, expect, and even acquiesce to
privacy intrusions once considered untenable, recent polls indicate that most Americans
deem warrantless wiretapping of their private phone conversations and email
―reasonable.‖ Many Americans Accept NSA Surveillance, ANGUS REID (Mar. 12, 2006),
http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/11692/many_americans_accept_nsa_surveillance.
According to the Angus Reid report, ―Many adults in the United States see nothing
wrong with the domestic electronic surveillance program initiated by their federal
government, according to a poll by TNS released by the Washington Post and ABC
News. [Fifty-four] percent of respondents think wiretapping telephone calls and emails
without court approval is an acceptable way to investigate terrorism.‖ Id.
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Semayne‟s Case (now colloquially known as ―a
man‘s home is his castle‖). This alluded to the
conception that a person‘s right to privacy
fundamentally derives from his property rights. In
view of that, the right to privacy was initially
recognized in relation to trespass, thus confirming
what was, for many years, the reigning conception
of privacy as rooted in ownership. This brief
historical aperçu at the very least elucidates the
understanding of privacy as the right to be left alone
in given spaces, defined externally rather than
inherently to personhood.41
This historical review similarly sheds light on the narrow
conception of and repeated references to seclusion offered in
contemporary tort law discourse.42 But what role might the notion
of seclusion play when, to paraphrase the Supreme Court of
Canada in Wise, ―many, if not the majority, of our activities are
inevitably carried out in the plain view of other persons.‖43 The
Common Law-based theory, featuring seclusion-oriented,
expectation-driven overarching principles, fuels most if not all
current privacy regulations. However, as basic assumptions about
privacy evolve, this theory no longer lends itself to the meaningful
development of a coherent legal framework for protecting digital
identity.44
The seclusion-centered approach is particularly insufficient
when it comes to managing the global flow of data. In the
41

Eltis, supra note 37, at 312 (internal citations omitted).
See generally Morton J. Horwitz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780–
1860 (Harvard Univ. Press 1977) (observing how the conception of property changed
from an eighteenth-century view that dominion over land conferred the power to prevent
others‘ interference to the nineteenth-century assumption that the essential attribute of
property ownership was the power to develop it irrespective of the consequences to
others); Jordan E. Segall, Note, Google Street View: Walking the Line of PrivacyIntrusion Upon Seclusion and Publicity Given to Private Facts in the Digital Age, 10 U.
PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL‘Y 1 (2010) (discussing tort claims of intrusion upon seclusion).
43
R. v. Wise, [1992] 1 S. C. R. 527, 564–65 (Can.), available at http://scc.lexum.
umontreal.ca/en/1992/1992rcs1-527/1992rcs1-527.html.
44
See Eltis, supra note 37, at 312 (explaining that the digital identity requires privacy
rights attached to ―persons rather than property, irrespective of property or special
constraints‖).
42
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information age, the ―reasonable expectation‖ standard tends to
reinforce social tolerance of intrusions once deemed unreasonable
in other contexts.45 Paradoxically, the more we are watched, the
less privacy we expect; the less we are personally bothered, the
more we expect others to share in our complacency. Therefore, if
privacy continues to be defined by reference to reasonable
expectations and seclusion, the sphere in which one can reasonably
claim ―solitude‖ will contract.46
Perhaps this is why civil law and other jurisdictions in Asia for
instance, are shifting towards a ―legitimate‖ rather than
―reasonable‖ expectation model, and focusing instead on
personhood and moral autonomy in this context.47 The privacy
framework offered by the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, for
example, illustrates the civilian approach in a broader sense and
focuses specifically on harm.48 Others, as further discussed, have
gone even further in embracing the personal autonomy approach to
privacy by proposing a legally enshrined ―right to be forgotten.‖49

45
See Spencer, supra note 36, at 844 (―We find imprecision embedded in the
expectation-driven conception of privacy because of the inevitable gray area between
what society clearly expects to be protected (that is, private), and what it clearly
understands to be unprotected. Effective encroachment occurs through incremental
incursions into this gray area of unsettled expectations. Moreover, individuals internalize
each incremental step of encroachment, and thereby lose any sense that privacy was once
possible in the encroached upon area. Because of this internalization, the expectationdriven privacy test cannot account for the cumulative effect of successive encroachments.
Instead, its focus on the current level of expectations facilitates the incremental erosion of
privacy.‖).
46
See generally Eltis, supra note 37.
47
See id. at 314.
48
See Paula J. Bruening, APEC Roundup: Update on Accountability Agents in
Implementation Of the APEC Framework, Development of Pathfinder Projects, Privacy
& Security L. Rep. No. 9PVLR1444 (Oct. 18, 2010), available at http://www.hunton.
com/files/Publication/1fd96285-2d28-4c2a-a4dd-d71f60777315/ Presentation/Publication
Attachment/aa33f70e-9f45-49d1-a76c-fab3b481f0e1/Bruening_APEC_BNA_Oct2010.pdf.
49
See infra Part III; see also Bruno Waterfield, „Right to be Forgotten‟ Proposed by
European Commission, TELEGRAPH (Nov. 5, 2010, 1:38 AM), http://www.telegraph.
co.uk/technology/news/8111866/Right-to-be-forgotten-proposed-by-EuropeanCommission.html.
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II. THE ―RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN‖: A BACKLASH?
While the civil law approach to privacy does offer significant
benefits in the digital world, current governance of privacy—
including even the novel ―right to be forgotten‖ theory—presents
some difficulties. Taking a somewhat reductionist view, there are
three potential ways to address the conceptual difficulties that stem
from the privacy paradigm. The first is to overregulate the area in
an effort to keep up with the changing technologies. The second is
to take a more case-specific approach to alleged misuses of
personal information. Finally, the third approach, which this
article posits is necessary to prevent the emergence of faddish
proposals, like the ―right to be forgotten,‖ takes a more principled
approach, while not overregulating.
The first view attempts to correct the shortcomings of the
current, lamentably anachronistic (common law) understanding of
privacy by piling on the regulation. This type of response is
exemplified in a different context by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002.50 While it is certainly beyond the scope of this endevor to
offer any in-depth discussion on point, suffice it to note that the
regulation-intensive Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted in response
to a wave of large-scale corporate accounting scandals.51 But a
knee-jerk, ―Sarbanes-Oxley‖ approach to data protection, however
well-intentioned, tends to be informed by panic;52in the privacy

50
Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
title 15 of the United States Code).
51
See Michael A. Thomason, Auditing the PCAOB: A Test to the Accountability of the
Uniquely Structured Regulator of Accountants, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1953, 1954–55 (2009);
Omar Ochoa, Note, Accounting for FASB: Why Administrative Law Should Apply to the
Financial Accounting Standards Board, 15 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 489, 492–93 (2011).
The SEC has relaxed the regulations somewhat since the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, in
an effort to lure back foreign companies to list in the United States. Seven Davidoff, With
Facebook, Debate Renews over I.P.O. Regulation, N.Y. TIMES: DEAL BOOK (Jan. 11,
2011, 7:09 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/01/11/with-facebook-debate-renewsover-i-p-o-regulation/.
52
Henry N. Butler & Larry Rubenstein, THE SARBANES-OXLEY DEBACLE: HOW TO FIX
IT AND WHAT WE‘VE LEARNED 1 (2006), available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/
20060308_ButlerRibsteinSOXDraft313.pdf.
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context, this panic takes the form of ―technology must keep up‖.53
Such a regulation-heavy approach tends to be ineffective and
indeed risks inadvertently punishing innovation while doing little
to protect the global consumer.54 Like the much maligned U.S.security framework, onerous rules ill-adapted to a global digital
economy place privacy in an antagonistic relationship with
progress.55 This in turn paradoxically encourages companies to
shift their focus to creatively sidestepping these rules in order to
avoid their chilling effects, rather than on meaningful privacy
protection.56
It bears repeating: the law cannot keep chasing after
technology; it will inevitably (by its very nature) be outpaced,
often before the proverbial ink dries. As Eric Schmidt once
observed ―High tech runs three times faster than normal business.
And the government runs three times slower than normal
businesses. So we have a nine-times gap.‖57 To account for this
inevitable outpacing, a second approach was developed which
attempts to reconcile privacy and innovation. This second

53
Milo Tiannopoulos, The Law Must Learn to Keep Up with Technology, TELEGRAPH
(Nov. 12, 2010 9:16 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/twitter/8128252/Thelaw-must-learn-to-keep-up-with-technology.html.
54
See, e.g., Vincent Gautrais, L‟encadrement Juridique du Cyberconsommateur
Québécois [The Lawful Supervision of the Quebec Cyberconsumer], in DROIT DU
COMMERCE ÉLECTRONIQUE 261 (Thémis 2002); Marc Lacoursière & Charlaine Bouchard,
Les Enjeux du Contrat de Consommation en Ligne [The Challenges of Online Consumer
Contract], 33 REVUE GÉNÉRALE DE DROIT 373, 395 (2004) (observing that complicated
online policies make an overly informed consumer more like an uninformed consumer);
see also generally Jean Michel Bruguière, La protection du cyber-consommateur dans la
loi pour la confiance dans l‘économie numérique, DROIT DE L‘IMMATÉRIEL (2005)
(similarly arguing that too much information paradoxically leaves the consumer
uninformed).
55
See, e.g., How Speed Traders are Changing Wall Street, CBS NEWS (Oct. 11, 2010
1:20 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/10/07/60minutes/main6936075.shtml
(discussing the algorithm-commanded trading occurring at the New York Stock
Exchange).
56
Nigel Kendall, Privacy Matters: How Can Firms Make the Most of the
Opportunities in Online Personal Data While Retaining Individuals‟ Right to Privacy?,
WALL ST. J. (June 29, 2011), available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB1000144052702303714704576382892280173266.html.
57
Gordon L. Crovitz, Google Speaks Truth to Power, WALL ST. J., Oct. 24, 2011, at A13,
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240529702046187045766453531
64833940.html.
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approach, critics argue, is embodied in the recent McCain-Kerry
proposal.58 The proposal, now known as the Commercial Privacy
Bill of Rights Act of 2011,59 may very well fall under this second
category.60 But in the race against implacable technology, the end
result of such efforts is often counter-productive. Thus, for
example, many privacy advocates argue that the McCain-Kerry
framework‘s broad and arguably circular definition of ―necessary‖
(for data collection purposes) ties regulators‘ hands.61 They further
posit that this definition effectively serves to undermine even
meager pre-existing protections by gifting an easy defense to overcollectors of personal information.62 This defense, in turn,
incentivizes the crafting of (even more) cumbersome policies that
would define most such data as ―necessary.‖63
58

See generally Edward A. Morse, From Private to Public Ordering: An Expanding
Federal Role for Regulating Privacy and Data Security, 2011 BUS. LAW TODAY 1 (2011),
available at http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/blt/content/2011/07/article-morse.shtml.
59
S. 799, 112th Cong. §§ 3(6), 202(b), 501(a) (2011) [hereinafter Commercial Privacy
Act], available at http://epic.org/privacy/consumer/Commercial_Privacy_Bill_of_
Rights_Text.pdf; Press Release, Sen. John Kerry, Kerry, McCain Introduce Commercial
Privacy: Bi-Partisan Legislation Would Enhance Protection and Control of Personal
Information (Apr. 12, 2011), http://kerry.senate.gov/press/release/?id=59a56001-54304b6d-b476-460040de027b [hereinafter Kerry, Press Release].
60
Kerry, Press Release, supra note 59.
61
See Dan Tynan, Five Big Problems with That New Privacy Bill of Rights, IT WORLD
(Apr. 13, 2011, 2:25 PM), http://www.itworld.com/security/155667/five-big-problemsnew-privacy-bill-rights. The Commercial Privacy Act exempts from the definition of
―unauthorized use‖ any ―use that is necessary for the improvement of transaction or
service delivery through research, testing analysis, and development‖ and any ―use that is
necessary for internal operations, including . . . information collected by an Internet
website about the visits to such website and the click-through rates at such website—to
improve website navigation and performance. . .‖ Commercial Privacy Act, supra note
59, at § 3(8)(B)(vii)–(viii)(II).
62
See Tynan, supra note 61.
63
See, e.g., Grant Gross, Kerry, McCain Introduced Online Privacy Bill, PC WORLD
(April 12, 2011, 4:20 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/224969/
kerry_mccain_introduced_online_privacy_bill.html (―The loopholes in the bill ‗could
leave consumers feeling that they‘re far more protected than they are,‘ said John
Simpson, consumer advocate at Consumer Watchdog. The bill may limit the FTC from
charging online businesses with unfair or deceptive practices in privacy cases, Simpson
added. If the bill was law, the FTC may not have been able to enter into a March
settlement with Google over privacy complaints about its social-media Buzz product, he
said.‖); see also Jeremy Byellin, Senators Kerry, McCain Introduce “Privacy Bill of
Rights” Bill, WESTLAW INSIDER (April 18, 2011), http://westlawinsider.com/top-legalnews/senators-kerry-mccain-introduce-privacy-bill-of-rights-bill/.
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The failure of the first and second approaches to privacy,
therefore, invites a third option—an option which should be a
principled rather than pigeonholed approach to privacy. The
absence, however, of such an option (at the national, let alone
transnational level) creates a vacuum out of which faddish
proposals, such as the ―right to be forgotten,‖ emerge.
A. The “Faddish” Proposal and its Impetus
Presumably as a backlash to what are, not unreasonably,
perceived as thoroughly ineffective, cumbersome, or simply
outpaced practices and initiatives on this side of the Atlantic, the
E.U., French Senate members64 and other European figures and
institutions65 have begun advocating for the recognition of a legal
―right to be forgotten.‖ Simply put, the argument is that if we
cannot find a way to protect privacy ab initio, then we must correct
matters after the fact by bestowing a right upon individuals to
retroactively ―erase‖ that which might harm them.66 That which,
this article submits, might otherwise have disappeared from public
view in time, if not for the Internet age‘s unprecedented infinite
memory. The counterargument to the right to be forgotten
movement emphasizes its countervailing values—namely, freedom
of expression, access to information and the integrity of the public
record.67
Not surprisingly then, recurring questions in the debate over ab
initio or post facto privacy protection focus on how the Internet
differs from past or similar mediums (such as the printed press,
where no such right exists) and why the explosion of the Internet

64
See Senators Yves Détraigne & Anne-Marie Escoffier, La vie privée à l‘heure des
mémoires numériques. Pour une confiance renforcée entre citoyens et société de
l‘information [Privacy in the Era of Digital Memories. For Increased Confidence
Between Citizens and the Information Society], Information Report No. 441 (2008–09),
on behalf of the Commission of Laws, filed May 27, 2009.
65
Most notably and inter alia is Spain‘s Privacy Commissioner. See David Roman,
Google Contests Spain‟s Privacy Laws, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 18, 2011), available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703396604576087573944344348.html.
66
See, e.g., Mallet-Poujol, supra note 1.
67
See Mallet-Poujol, supra note 1. See generally Werro, supra note 13.
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prompts revisiting or even re-interpreting existing norms.68
In a world with an Internet of infinite memory,69 like ours, it
stands to reason that many of us have quite possibly and irrefutably
lost control over our identity—how we are perceived when our
―portrait‖ is amateurishly assembled in the aggregate online— and
possibly even our existence.70 Consider the example of the
Spanish plastic surgeon, Hugo Guidotti Russo, which spearheads
the legal battle over the ―right to be forgotten‖ in Europe. 71 This
particular surgeon‘s fight with Google over his reputation may
change the meaning of accuracy of information and freedom of
expression in the digital age.72
Over twenty years ago, Russo had a widely covered dispute
with one of his patients over an allegedly botched breast surgery.73
Since the incident, Russo has ostensibly practiced successfully or
at least without incident. However, the mere mention of his name
online produces a myriad of results all linked to the supposedly
bungled and very gruesome procedure.74 The results discussing
the alleged twenty-year old mishap appear at the top of the results
list and dramatically overshadow—even overwhelm—any and all
other presumably relevant, and more recent information relating to
his practice. Accordingly, Russo‘s professional persona—and
indeed identity (online and off)—has been forever tainted and
possibly reduced to what he contends is an isolated incident, which

68

See Lyria Bennett Moses, Why Have a Theory of Law and Technological Change?,
8 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 589, 595 (2007).
69
Jeffrey Rosen, The Web Means the End of Forgetting, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 25,
2010, at MM30, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/magazine/25privacyt2.html.
70
See, e.g., Zick Rubin, How the Internet Tried to Kill Me, N. Y. TIMES, Mar. 13,
2011, at WK11, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/13/opinion/13rubin.
html?_r=2.
71
Flock, supra note 12.
72
Russo is one of ninety Spanish citizens who successfully lobbied Spain‘s Data
Portection Agency toward adopting a ―right to be forgotten‖ mindset online. See id.
73
Paul Sonne, Max Colchester & David Roman, Plastic Surgeon and Net‟s Memory
Figure in Google Face-Off in Spain, WALL ST. J., Mar.7, 2011, at B1, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703921504576094130793996412.html#
ixzz1Htm1hM8q.
74
See Flock, supra note 12.
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was settled over twenty years ago.75
The Internet, being the first go-to destination for people when
confronted with a query, is posing significant difficulties for
Russo. Many of Russo‘s patients and potential clients, colleagues
or business associates use Internet search databases as their first
destination for information and the gruesome reports presumably
dissuade all but the rare, most dedicated and meticulous searchers
who would take pains to go beyond these headlines. The cyber
search at the very least provides a decontextualized and
fragmented version of Russo‘s career and professional identity—
the very difficulty the right to be forgotten, drawing on the Statute
of Limitations rationale, purports to remedy. Such a version is due
to the hierarchical nature of search engine results and their order,
which, as far as is known due to trade secret issues, takes little
account of chronology or other pertinent factors. Perhaps giving
greater weight to time in search result ranking would serve to
alleviate some of the distortions caused by dated information
overshadowing more current data in the online context and
therefore should be considered by informational intermediaries as
they prepare to contend with cases like Russo's. If Russo succeeds
in his campaign against Google and Spain successfully sends his
case to the European Court of Justice,76 it could lead to a major
European ruling on online personal data and on the so-called right
to be forgotten on the Internet.77
As illustrated, eternally enshrined falsehoods—or even
decontextualized truths—online boast an aura of accuracy and are
not easily remedied by truths or offline context. The difficulty of
proving an otherwise irrefutable fact online is amusingly illustrated
by a piece in the New York Times written by Zick Rubin, aptly
titled ―How the Internet Tried to Kill Me.‖ 78 Rubin chronicles his
own painful struggle with search engines and numerous fruitless
attempts to prove that he was still alive after a clerical error listed
75

See Sonne, Clochester & Roman, supra note 73, at B1.
See e.g., Josh Halliday, Europe‟s Highest Court to Rule on Google Privacy Battle in
Spain, GUARDIAN, (Mar. 1, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2011/mar/01/
google-spain-privacy-court-case.
77
Sonne, Clochester & Roman, supra note 73, at B1.
78
Rubin, supra note 65.
76
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him as deceased.
professions.79
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In reality, Rubin had merely changed

Businesses face similar difficulties, particularly in terms of the
decontextualized and fragmented nature of information online. For
example, consider a popular restaurant‘s fate on a commonly
visited review site. While majority of user reviews of New York
City‘s Tapeo 29 are positive, culminating in an overall review of
3.5 stars, eight reviews paint a dreadful picture of the restaurant.80
While these eight reviews comprise only six percent of the total
customer reviews, they presumably may be enough to discourage
future patrons from visiting the establishment. Luckily for Tapeo,
these negative reviews are dispersed throughout pages of reviews
potentially minimizing the negative impact, but not all restaurants
are so lucky. One reviewer of Tart, a Los Angeles restaurant,
posted on the review site complaining about the restaurant‘s turkey
meatloaf.81 Tart‘s owner complained to the website, mainly
because Tart does not serve turkey meatloaf, but the website
refused to remove the one-star review.82 These damaging,
potentially false, reviews are frequent occurrences for businesses,
often leaving them with no choice but to hire consultants who
79

Id. (―When I Googled myself last month, I was alarmed to find the following item,
from a Wikia.com site on psychology, ranked fourth among the results: ‗Zick Rubin
(1944-1997) was an American social psychologist.‘ This was a little disconcerting. I
really was born in 1944 and I really was an American social psychologist. Before I
entered law school in midlife, I was a professor of psychology at Harvard and Brandeis
and had written books in the field. But, to the very best of my knowledge, I wasn‘t dead .
. . When I complained to Wikia.com, I got a prompt and friendly reply from its cofounder, Angela Beesley, sending me her ‗kind regards‘ and telling me that she had
corrected the article. But when I checked a week later, the ‗1944-1997‘ had returned. So
I e-mailed her again (subject line: ‗inaccurate report that I am dead‘), and got the
following explanation: My change to the page was reverted on the grounds that the info
included in this article was sourced from Reber and Reber‘s the Dictionary of
Psychology, third edition, 2001. Is it possible the page is talking about a different Zick
Rubin? The article is about a social psychologist.‘ I didn‘t doubt that the Dictionary of
Psychology was a highly authoritative source, and yet I persisted in wondering why
Reber—or, for that matter, Reber—would know more than I would about whether I was
alive or dead.‖)
80
See Reviews for Tapeo 29, YELP.COM, http://www.yelp.com/biz/tapeo-29-new-york
(last visited Sept. 11, 2011).
81
Claire Cain Miller, The Review Site Yelp Draws Some Outcries of its Own, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 3, 2009, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/03/
technology/start-ups/03yelp.html?_r=1.
82
See id.
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flood the net with (sometimes false) information, meant to distract
from the negative or unwanted data.
It bears emphasis that the harm complained of in these cases is
not in the mere fact of being observed, as many individuals and
businesses actively seek out digital notoriety and arguably benefit
from personalized consumerism or targeted ads. Rather, the
concern lies in being—perhaps perpetually—mislabeled within a
web of infinite memory. Furthermore, the web now extends to the
offline world, through for example the Internet of things, and
leaves one powerless to assert or develop an image or identity
independently of the online content, which now spills into—and
offline reality. Plainly put, this powerlessness flies in the face of
the American ideal of reinventing oneself and likely has
consequences yet unknown. One obvious result might of course be
to chill online speech, as individuals and indeed corporations grow
increasingly weary of having voluntarily posted data irreparably
manipulated or inadvertently distorted.
Of course, some may take the position of Google's Eric
Schmidt, namely ―if you have something that you don‘t want
anyone to know maybe you shouldn‘t be doing it in the first
place.‖83 The difficulty in that approach lies in its erroneous
assumption of choice and ostensible understanding of individuals
as static over time. In fact, personal identity is dynamic (now more
than ever) and while one's sixteen year-old self might indeed
consciously choose to post certain information about themselves
(at that particular stage of life online) her thirty and even sixty
year-old self (with presumably entirely different notions of what is
considered appropriate) will have to live with the consequences of
that supposedly ―informed‖ decision. While it is certainly true that
we must live with the irremediable consequences of the (often
foolish) choices and tragically missed opportunities of our younger
selves for all eternity, the distinction brought to bear by the digital
age is chiefly the following: human memory is nothing if not
fallible. As the French correctly observe: ―la memoire est une
faculte qui oublie‖ or, translated, ―memory is a faculty that
forgets.‖ In other words, memory is fallible and distinctively so by
83

Inside the Mind of Google (CNBC television broadcast Dec. 3, 2009).
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design to allow us to recreate the past in a way we can live within
our own minds; to move on; to forgive ourselves and others for
mistakes we may not be able to correct. The Internet quite simply
vitiates any such forgiveness and we have yet to find a
normative—or social mechanism for that matter—capable of
assuaging the difficulties created by the significant change to our
social order brought on by the absence of the (often healthy and
normal) process of forgetting.
Even worse, as with Zick Rubin‘s experience, a version of
one‘s identity that is entirely incompatible with one‘s own truth—
or perhaps even ―the truth‖—might become entrenched as public
record. The (quintessentially American) capacity to reinvent
oneself, aptly illustrated most recently in the popular TV series
Mad Men, or even to evolve in one‘s views and ideas, is therefore
either lost or severely compromised.84
These concerns are made worse yet by the chief and
increasingly tempting ―remedy‖ now offered by online image
consulting firms (or Internet ―reputation management‖ firms).
These firms deliberately flood the net with false data in an effort to
confuse and distract from damaging existing information that
cannot be removed.85 This seems to threaten any integrity or
reliability the Internet may have had—and must have—for its
effective survival.

84

See Bill Keveney, Stars of „Mad Men‟ share thoughts on their characters, USA
TODAY (July 16, 2010), http://www.usatoday.com/life/television/news/2010-07-16madmen16_VA_N.htm (describing the characters of the show and elaborating on the
development of the characters—their reinvention—throughout the seasons).
85
See, e.g., Mark Bunting & Roy Lipski, Drowned Out? Rethinking Corporate
Reputation Management for the Internet, 5 J. COMMC‘N MGMT. 170, 175–77 (2000);
Loretta Chao, China Shutters 6,600 Websites for Manipulating Information Online,
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 29, 2011, 7:57 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2011/
08/29/china-shutters-6600-websites-for-manipulating-information-online/ (―The websites
involved ‗illegal groups which claimed to specialize in deleting online news stories and
posts with negative influences or hiring other netizens to spread certain kinds of
information or opinions on the Internet‘ for deals totaling more than 1.13 million yuan
($177,000).‖); Claire Prentice, Online Profile Spring Cleaning, BBC NEWS (Sept. 24,
2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-11381037 (―For a fee, [online reputation
managers] will monitor what is written about clients and drown out unwanted comments
or photographs by creating or sourcing a barrage of positive Google-friendly content.‖).
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III. THE CIVIL LAW VIEW
A. The Right to be Forgotten‟s Underlying Rationale: Throw out
the Bathwater but Consider the Baby
As previously noted, the ―right to be forgotten,‖ in addition to
being contentious and far from entrenched in European law or
practice, does not lend itself to the American context.
Notwithstanding these issues, the legal thinking underlying the
right to be forgotten may itself be useful in reframing the right to
privacy in the digital age, even given what some jurisdictions
would label the absolutist U.S. approach to freedom of
expression.86
Thus for example, concepts like ―la
responsabilisation de l‟individu,‖ roughly translated as individual
responsibility, appear in both European and American practice, and
help translate the E.U.‘s privacy principle into American dialect.87
For instance, the French Senate Report addressing the Right to be
Forgotten stresses a ―homo numericus‖ or ―protector of his own
data‖ approach to privacy, allowing the individual more control
over his or her personal information—granting control over the
duration of data retention and facilitating easier deletion of posted
information.88
Therefore, while at first glance the European approach (in a
broader sense) appears to complicate matters by emphasizing the
seemingly obscure notion of dignity, it ultimately helps clarify
matters by adding a ―duty‖ component for both the individuals and
the information-users to the ever-nebulous right to privacy.89
86
Berin Szoka, “Privacy” as Censorship: Fleischer Dismantles the EU‟s “Right to
Forget”, TECH. LIBERATION FRONT (Mar. 9, 2011), http://techliberation.com/2011/03/09/
privacy-as-censorship-fleischer-dismantles-the-eus-right-to-forget/.
87
See Deborah Collier, Privacy Working Group Holds Panel Discussion on „Right to
be Forgotten‟, SWINE LINE (Aug. 1, 2011), http://swineline.org/?p=5773; Natch Greyes,
A Right to be Forgotten, WM. & MARY L. SCH. STUDENT INTELL. PROP. SOC‘Y (June 17,
2011), http://sips.blogs.wm.edu/2011/06/17/a-right-to-be-forgotten/.
88
Christian Cointat, Proposed legislation to better guarantee the right to privacy in
the digital age, Report No. 330 (2009–2010), on behalf of the Judiciary Committee, filed
Feb. 24, 2010, available at http://www.senat.fr/rap/l09-330/l09-330_mono.html.
89
See, e.g., Bob Sullivan, „La Difference‟ is Stark in EU, U.S. Privacy Laws, MSNBC,
http://msnbc.msn.com/id/15221111/ns/technology_and_science-privacy_lost/t/ladifference-stark-eu-us-privacy-laws (last updated Oct. 19, 2006, 11:19 AM) (describing
the various consent requirements for information usage in many parts of Europe).
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Moreover, in the German view, for instance, privacy, conceived at
least in part as ―informational self-determination,‖90 comprises
both rights and duties. The German Constitutional Court, in its
now-famous Census decision, held that the ―‗basic right [of
informational self-determination] warrants [. . .] the capacity of the
individual to determine in principle the disclosure and use of
his/her personal data.‘‖91 ―Rather than giving exclusive control or
a property interest to the data subject, the right of informational
self-determination compels the State to organize data processing so
that personal autonomy will be respected. Thus, the right both
limits certain actions and obliges other activities on the part of the
State.‖92
Thus, control over personal information is the power to control
a measure of one‘s identity. This is indispensable to the ―free
unfolding of personality.‖93 It is also a right to a ―rightful
portrayal of self,‖94 crucial in the digital age, as illustrated by the
case of Dr. Russo above. Russo‘s own loss of control over his
―portrayal of self‖ indeed catapulted the right to be forgotten
movement in Europe to where it is today, at least in part.
Another example of the duty-driven thinking, from the French
perspective this time, is the recent privacy case, Bruno B. v.
Giraud et Migot,95 in which the Cour de cassation qualified its

90

65 BVerfGE 1, 41–52 (1983); Paul Schwartz, The Computer in German and
American Constitutional Law: Towards an American Right of Informational SelfDetermination, 37 AM. J. COMPARATIVE L. 675, 687 (1989), available at
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/840221.pdf?acceptTC=true.
91
Andras Jori, DATA PROTECTION LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 3.2 (2006),
http://www.dataprotection.eu/pmwiki/pmwiki.php?n=Main.SecondGeneration. See also
Eberle, supra note 34, at 1009 (―A more innovative aspect of informational selfdetermination is that it endows individuals with the right to control the portrayal of the
facts and details of their lives, even if uncomfortable or embarrassing. This right
empowers persons to shield hurtful truths from public scrutiny in order to safeguard
reputation or other personality interests. The right also encompasses protection of
personal honor as an outgrowth of personality.‖).
92
Schwartz, supra note 90, at 690.
93
Eberle, supra note 34, at 966.
94
Eberle, supra note 34, at 1014.
95
Cour de Cassation [Cass.] [Supreme Court for Judicial Matters] Paris, soc., Dec. 15,
2009, Bull civ. V, No. 2651.
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earlier ruling in Nikon France SA Co. v. Onof.96 The Court in
Bruno opined that Bruno B.‘s employer was justified in opening
emails it assumed to be work related, since the employee, Bruno,
failed to explicitly mark the documents as ―private.‖97 This
decision significantly shifts the burden to enforce privacy
expectations onto employees.98 This in turn implies and indeed
reiterates that under the Civilian notion of privacy, individuals—
employees and arguably consumers by analogy—have not only
broad rights but also duties to safeguard their privacy—obligations
to enlighten would-be violators as to when they expect privacy by
taking affirmative steps in that direction (such as marking an email
―private‖). The privacy duty not only empowers individuals but
also appreciably reduces uncertainty by eliminating some of the
guesswork related to people‘s expectations of privacy in the digital
age and lessens the fear of unwanted intrusions.99
B. Personality Rights and Countervailing Duties
The fact that Civilians typically regard rights as implying
countervailing duties is often neglected in recurring discussions of
those rights. In civilian tradition, privacy is considered to be a
―personality right,‖ but the concept of personality rights is alien to
the common law.100 Therefore, in civil law jurisdictions, privacy

96
Cour de cassation [Cass.] [Supreme Court for Judicial Matters] Paris, soc., Oct. 2,
2001, Bull civ. V, No. 4164, available at http://www.courdecassation.fr/jurisprudence_2/
chambre_sociale_576/arret_n_1159.html (holding (to the great dismay of U.S. firms) that
personal dignity precluded employers from opening employee emails).
97
Bruno B., Cour de Cassation [Cass.] [Supreme Court for Judicial Matters] Paris,
soc., Dec. 15, 2009, Bull civ. V, No. 2651.
98
See Jeffries & Lindsey, supra note 34. The case, however, has been criticized and is
merely a first step. See generally id. As the purpose of this piece is not to analyze
European case law but rather to provide an overview of the underlying civilian
philosophy as it pertains to reconceptualizing privacy, the significance of the Bruno B.
ruling lies at a much higher level of abstraction, namely, the seldom discussed Civilian
focus on duties as a corollary of rights and its application to privacy in the realm of
analytics.
99
See, e.g., Tanzinia Vega, A Call for a Federal Office to Guide Online Privacy, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 17, 2010, at B3, available at www.nytimes.com/2010/12/17/business/
media/17privacy.html.
100
See, e.g., Eberle, supra note 34, at 973 (with respect to German thinking in
particular, observing that: ―By comparison, American law has never really sought to
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attaches to persons rather than property, irrespective of property or
special constraints.101 In other words, ―[p]ersonality rights focus
on the être—the being—in contrast with the avoir—the having‖
and are significantly divorced from territory.102
Privacy, as a personality right, is predicated on dignity. 103 For
example, Article 2 of the German Constitution (Grund Gesetz)
provides that: ―everyone shall have the right to the free
development of his personality insofar as he does not violate the
rights of others or offend against the constitutional order or against
morality.‖104 In the privacy context, the concept of dignity in
Germany is encompassed within ―the right to free unfolding of
personality.‖105 In America, by contrast, dignity ―falls under the
rubric of privacy, including the zone of personal autonomy that
emanates therefrom.‖106
While very important differences exist between the approaches
discussed above, conceiving of the right to privacy as a personality
right, free of territorial constraints, generally allows the civilian
legal method to grasp privacy as a zone of intimacy delineated by
the basic needs of personhood, rather than by space or
ownership.107 ―Personality allows one to define oneself in relation
to society‖ and can, therefore, be a very important ―impression
management‖ tool in the Internet age. 108
More specifically and returning to duties, as Popovici observes
define human dignity, nor human personhood or personality.‖); Adrian Popovici,
Personality Rights—A Civil Law Concept, 50 LOY. L. REV. 349, 349–51 (2004).
101
See Popovici, supra note 100, at 357.
102
Id. at 352.
103
See generally Eberle, supra note 34.
104
See Eberle, supra note 34, at 976.
105
Eberle, supra note 34, at 966.
106
Id. For a discussion of the many other differences that exist between the French and
German concepts of privacy and dignity, and personality rights generally, compare
Popovici, supra note 100, at 351 (discussing the French approach in which personality
rights are private law rights first and foremost), with Eberle, supra note 34 at 979
(―German personality law is thus a creature of the Constitutional Court, as rights of
privacy are of the Supreme Court.‖).
107
Eberele, supra note 34, at 980. (―Personality allows one to define oneself in relation
to society.‖).
108
Erving Goffman, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE 208-12 (Anchor
Books Doubleday 1959).
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in the French context ―personality rights, as subjective rights,
comprise both an active and corresponding passive side. The
active side is the ‗power‘ of the right‘s holder over the object of
the right; the passive side is the ‗duty‘ of others to respect this very
same object.‖109
The dual emphasis is reflected in the
controversial ―right to be forgotten,‖ as well. Thus, (translated)
―[a]dvocating in favor of a right to be forgotten must not lead to a
‗deresponsabilization‘ of individuals. The ‗right to be forgotten‘
does not mean that everyone will have the right to rewrite their
personal history.‖110
CONCLUSION
ZUCKERBERG IS RIGHT—IN A WAY. . .
The Civil law method‘s conception of privacy as personality
rights with their countervailing duties (rather than the ‗right to be
forgotten per se) appears commeasurable with the goals of privacy
management in an age of rapid technological advances. Using the
personality rights paradigm, the primary harm consists of the loss
of meaningful control over the integrity of information in identity
management, rather than freedom from observation.111 However,
the seemingly broad and dignity-centric conception of the Civilian
system is pragmatically tempered by a profound attachment to the
notion of duties alongside rights and fosters empowerment and
responsibility.
Perhaps, however, this glimpse into civilian thinking can
eventually lead to an alternative approach to conceptualizing
privacy in the digital context—namely, a cross-cultural one in
which both Zuckerberg and Vladeck are (at least in part) correct.112
109

Popovici, supra note 100, at 354.
See Détraigne & Escoffier, supra note 64.
111
This is illustrated by the German example and its focus on ―informational selfdetermination.‖ See Eberle, supra 34, at 980.
112
In fact, comparative analysis of this sort, as former chief justice of the Supreme
Court of Isreal Aharon Barak observed, is an ―important source of inspiration, one that
enriches legal thinking, makes law more creative, and strengthens the democratic ties and
foundations of different legal systems.‖ Adam Liptak, U.S. Supreme Court‟s Global
Influence is Waning, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/17/
world/americas/17iht-18legal.16249317.html.
110
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That is to say that while the old notion of aloneness or seclusion is
indeed passé, privacy as the inherent right and duty to control
one‘s identity—and the harm to privacy being the loss of that
autonomy—is very much alive. The thinking underlying the duty
theory in turn, as per the European tradition, can be harnessed
towards a clearer definition of privacy-stakeholder obligation and
an easier flow of data across borders.
Accordingly, privacy is a matter of affirmative rather than
negative rights, and consists of two parts. First, privacy can be
conceived as the right to engage in individual self-definition and
self-invention, rather than a right to be secluded or free from
surveillance. Second, adopting civilian parlance, which correlates
rights with duties, privacy is also the responsibility not to
unnecessarily compromise one‘s own information in the naïve
hope that the information will not be misused.
Thus, in order to eventually craft a transystemically viable
framework, it becomes critical to first clarify what privacy means.
Furthermore, in light of the enduring and potentially devastating
ramifications of privacy slip-ups and the difficulties associated
with attempts to ―repair‖ related damage via ad hoc solutions, not
hospitable to American notions of expression, corporations
dependent on consumer trust and users themselves share a
profound interest in rethinking the basic concepts that populate the
current privacy frameworks. If nothing else, European thinking,
most notably the debate over the ―right to be forgotten,‖ can help
advance that discussion significantly.

